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Abstract 
What are the effects of strengthening patent protection on income and consumption inequality? 
To analyze this question, this paper develops a quality-ladder growth model with wealth heterogeneity 
and elastic labor supply. The model predicts that strengthening patent protection increases (a) economic 
growth by stimulating R&D and (b) income inequality by raising the return on assets. However, whether 
it increases consumption inequality depends on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Calibrating the 
model to US data shows that strengthening patent protection increases income inequality by more than 
consumption inequality, and this divergence between income and consumption inequality is consistent 
with the data.  
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1. Introduction 
What are the effects of strengthening patent protection on income and consumption inequality? To 
analyze this question, this paper incorporates heterogeneity in households’ wealth into a canonical 
quality-ladder growth model with elastic labor supply. In this model, the aggregate economy is always on 
a unique and stable balanced-growth path. Given the balanced-growth behavior of the aggregate economy 
and an exogenous distribution of initial wealth, the endogenous distribution of assets in subsequent 
periods is stationary and equal to its initial distribution. The model predicts that strengthening patent 
protection increases (a) economic growth by stimulating R&D investment and (b) income inequality by 
raising the return on assets. However, whether it also increases consumption inequality depends on the 
elasticity of intertemporal substitution. If this elasticity is less (greater) than unity, strengthening patent 
protection would increase (decrease) consumption inequality. Calibrating the model to aggregate data of 
the US economy shows that strengthening patent protection leads to a larger increase in income inequality 
than consumption inequality. This divergence between income and consumption inequality is consistent 
with the empirical pattern in the US. 
 Krueger and Perri (2006) and Blundell et al. (2008) provide empirical evidence to show that the 
sharp increase in income inequality in the US since the 80’s was accompanied by a much smaller increase 
in consumption inequality. For example, based on the Consumer Expenditure Survey, Krueger and Perri 
(2006) find that the variance of log of income (consumption) increases by over 20% (about 5%) from 
1980 to 2004. During the same period, R&D investment and the number of patents granted have increased 
(see Figures 1 and 2) while patent protection in the U.S. has strengthened.1 Table 1 presents an index for 
the strength of patent protection in the US from Park (2008).2  
Year 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
United States 3.83 3.83 3.83 3.83 4.35 4.68 4.68 4.88 4.88 4.88 
Table 1: Index of Patent Rights from Park (2008)
 
                                                 
1 See Jaffe (2000), Gallini (2002) and Jaffe and Lerner (2004) for a discussion on the changes in patent policy.  
2 The index is on a scale of 0 to 5, and a larger number indicates stronger patent protection. See Ginarte and Park 
(1997) and Park (2008) for details. 
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Given this empirical pattern, we calibrate the R&D-growth model to see whether it can replicate a similar 
divergence in income and consumption inequality as in the data. The model predicts that the coefficient of 
variation of income over the coefficient of variation of consumption increases from 1.55 in 1980 to 1.69 
in 2004. This finding suggests that patent policy may provide a partial explanation on the recent trend of 
income and consumption inequality in the US. 
The intuition of the results is as follows. Strengthening patent protection increases R&D as well 
as the equilibrium growth rate that drives up the rate of return on assets. This higher return on assets 
increases the income of asset-wealthy households relative to asset-poor households. As for the ambiguous 
effect on consumption inequality, the higher growth rate also increases the fraction of assets that needs to 
be saved. Therefore, whether the relative consumption between asset-wealthy households and asset-poor 
households increases or decreases depends on the relative increase in the equilibrium growth rate and the 
real interest rate, which in turn is determined by the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.  
 
Related Literature 
This paper relates to the strands of literature on income inequality, economic growth and patent policy. 
Garcia-Penalosa and Turnovsky (2006) incorporate heterogeneity in households’ wealth into a canonical 
AK growth model with elastic labor supply and develop an approach to show that the distribution of 
assets is stationary.3 The current study adopts a similar approach to show that the distribution of assets is 
also stationary in a canonical quality-ladder growth model. An interesting difference between the two 
models is that the AK model relies on elastic labor supply to generate an endogenous income distribution 
while the quality-ladder model does not. 
 Chou and Talmain (1996), Li (1998), Zweimuller (2000) and Foellmi and Zweimuller (2006) also 
consider wealth heterogeneity in R&D-growth models, and they focus on the effects of wealth inequality 
on growth through different channels, such as the concavity/convexity of the labor Engel curve in Chou 
                                                 
3 See, also, Bertola (1993) for an early study on income distribution in the AK growth model and Caselli and 
Ventura (2000) for a study that considers multiple dimensions of heterogeneity, such as wealth, labor productivity 
and preference for public goods.  
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and Talmain (1996), indivisible consumption of quality goods in Li (1998), hierarchical preferences in 
Zweimuller (2000) and Foellmi and Zweimuller (2006). The current paper differs from these studies by 
considering the effects of patent policy on income and consumption inequality given wealth inequality 
that is independent of growth in the model.  
 Bertola et al. (chapter 10, 2006) also considers an R&D-growth model in which wealth inequality 
is independent of growth due to homothetic preferences. The current study differs from Bertola et al. in 
the following ways. Firstly, they consider a variety-expanding model with inelastic labor supply while the 
current study considers a quality-ladder model with elastic labor supply and uses the model to analyze the 
effects of patent breadth. Secondly, they focus on the distribution of income between entrepreneurs and 
workers while the current study focuses on income inequality under a general distribution of assets among 
households. Thirdly, the current study analyzes consumption inequality in addition to income inequality 
and shows that these two measures of inequality could in theory go in opposite directions. Finally, the 
current study complements their qualitative analysis by providing a quantitative analysis on the effects of 
patent breadth on income and consumption inequality. 
This paper also relates to the literature on patent policy and economic growth. Given R&D 
underinvestment suggested by Jones and Williams (1998, 2000), patent policy is an important instrument 
that can be used to correct for this market failure and increase growth. Li (2001) and O’Donoghue and 
Zweimuller (2004) analyze the growth effects of patent breadth in a quality-ladder model that has a 
representative household. Given that patent policy may also affect income inequality, the current paper 
contributes to this literature by providing a framework that can be applied to investigate the effects of 
patent breadth on income and consumption inequality in addition to economic growth. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 defines the 
equilibrium. Section 4 analyzes the effects of patent breadth and calibrates the model. The final section 
concludes with a discussion on the empirical importance of the return of assets on income inequality. 
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2. A Quality-Ladder Model with Heterogeneous Households 
This section develops a quality-ladder model similar to Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman and 
Helpman (1991) by adding mainly three features (a) heterogeneity in households’ wealth, (b) variable 
patent breadth as in Li (2001), and (c) elastic labor supply. Given that quality-ladder models have been 
well-studied, the model’s familiar components will be briefly described below while the new features will 
be described in more details. 
 
 2.1. Households  
There is a unit continuum of identical households (except for the initial distribution of wealth) indexed by 
]1,0[∈h . Each household h has a standard iso-elastic utility function given by  
(1) ∫∞ −− ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−=
0
1
1
1)]()([)( . dthlhCehU ttt γ
γφ
ρ . 
),0( ∞∈γ  is the inverse of the intertemporal substitution elasticity γε /1≡ . 1== εγ  corresponds to 
the case of log utility. )(hCt  is the consumption of final goods. Each household is endowed with one unit 
of time to allocate between leisure )(hlt  and work )(hLt . 0≥φ  is a preference parameter on leisure, and 
setting φ  to zero corresponds to the case of inelastic labor supply. ρ  is the exogenous discount rate. To 
ensure that lifetime utility is bounded,   
(a1) g)1( γρ −> , 
where g  denotes the balanced-growth rate of consumption.  
Each household maximizes utility subject to a sequence of budget constraints given by  
(2) )()()()( hCPhLWhVRhV ttttttt −+=& . 
)(hVt  is the nominal value of assets owned by household h at time t. The share of assets owned by 
household h at time 0 is exogenously given by 000, /)()( VhVhsv ≡  that has a general distribution function 
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with a mean of one and a standard deviation of vσ . tR  is the nominal rate of return on assets. Household 
h endogenously supplies )(hLt  to earn the nominal wage rate tW . tP  is the price of final goods. From 
the household’s intratemporal optimization, household h’s labor supply is determined by 
(3) )()()(1 . hCPhlhL tttt φ==− , 
where tW  is normalized to one. From the household’s intertemporal optimization, the familiar Euler 
equation is given by  
(4) 
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Lemma 1 shows that the consumption growth rate is the same across households. To ensure that the Euler 
equation has the usual properties, the following parameter condition is assumed.  
(a2) 0)1( >−− γφγ . 
 
Lemma 1: Aggregate consumption and the consumption for household h evolve according to  
(5) 
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for all h. Also, aggregate labor supply is determined by ttt CPL .1 φ−= .   
Proof: Differentiate (3) with time and substitute it into (4). As for tL , integrate (3) with h.■  
 
Final goods are produced by a standard Cobb-Douglas aggregator over a continuum of 
differentiated intermediates goods ]1,0[∈i  given by  
(6) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= ∫1
0
)(lnexp diiXC tt . 
We define a stationary variable ttt CPE ≡  that denotes the aggregate nominal expenditure, which will be 
used to analyze the stability of the balanced-growth path.  
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 2.2. Intermediate Goods 
There is a continuum of industries indexed by ]1,0[∈i  producing the differentiated intermediate goods. 
Each industry i is dominated by a temporary monopolistic leader who holds a patent for the latest 
technology in the industry. The production function for the leader in industry i is  
(7) )()( ,
)( iLziX tx
in
t
t= . 
)(, iL tx  is the number of workers in industry i. 1>z  is the exogenous productivity improvement from 
each invention, and )(int  is the number of inventions that has occurred as of time t. Given 
)(intz , 
(8) )()( /1/)( inintt tt zzWiMC ==  
is the nominal marginal cost of production for the leader in industry i.  
As commonly assumed in the literature, the current and former industry leaders engage in 
Bertrand competition, and the profit-maximizing price for the current leader is a constant markup over the 
marginal cost given by  
(9) )(),()( iMCbziP tt μ= , 
where bzbz =),(μ  for ]1,0(∈b  that captures the level of patent breadth. In Aghion and Howitt (1992) 
and Grossman and Helpman (1991), there is complete patent protection against imitation such that 1=b . 
Li (2001) generalizes the policy environment to capture incomplete patent protection against imitation 
such that )1,0(∈b .4 Because of incomplete patent protection, the current leader’s invention enables the 
former leader to increase her productivity by a factor of bz −1  without infringing the current leader’s 
patent. Therefore, the limit-pricing markup for the current leader is given by bz . An increase in the level 
of patent breadth b  enables the current leader to charge a higher markup μ , and the resulting increase in 
the amount of monopolistic profit improves the incentives for R&D and stimulates growth.  
  
                                                 
4 O’Donoghue and Zweimuller (2004) refer to this form of patent protection as lagging breadth, and they formalize 
another form of patent protection known as leading breadth (i.e. patent protection against subsequent innovations). 
For the purpose of the current study, the consideration of lagging patent breadth is sufficient.   
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 2.3. R&D 
Denote the nominal value of an invention for industry i as )(~ iVt . Due to the Cobb-Douglas specification 
in (6), the amount of monopolistic profit is the same across industries (i.e. tt i ππ =)(  for ]1,0[∈i ). As a 
result, tt ViV
~)(~ =  for ]1,0[∈i . Because patents are the only assets in the economy, their market value 
equals the value of assets owned by households (i.e. tt VV =~ ). The familiar no-arbitrage condition is  
(10) tttttt VVVR λπ −+= & . 
The left-hand side of (10) is the nominal return from this asset. The right-hand side of (10) is the sum of 
(a) the monopolistic profit tπ  generated by this asset, (b) the potential capital gain, and (c) the expected 
capital loss due to creative destruction, in which tλ  is the Poisson arrival rate of inventions.  
 There is a continuum of R&D entrepreneurs indexed by ]1,0[∈j , and they hire workers to create 
inventions. The expected profit for entrepreneur j is 
(11) )()()( ,, jLWjVj trttttr −= λπ . 
The Poisson arrival rate of inventions for entrepreneur j is )()( ,. jLj trt ϕλ = , where ϕ  captures the 
productivity of R&D workers. The zero-profit condition from the R&D sector is given by  
(12) 1== tt WVϕ . 
This condition determines the allocation of labor between production and R&D.  
 
3. Decentralized Equilibrium 
This section defines the equilibrium and shows that the aggregate economy is always on a unique and 
stable balanced-growth path. Given the balanced-growth behavior of the economy and a distribution of 
initial wealth, Section 3.1 shows that the distribution of assets in subsequent periods is stationary.  
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The equilibrium is a sequence of prices ∞=0}),(,,,{ tttttt ViPPWR  and a sequence of allocations 
∞
=0,, )}(),(),(),(),({ ttttrtxt hChLjLiLiX  such that in each period,  
a. household ]1,0[∈h  chooses )}(),({ hLhC tt  to maximize utility taking },,{ ttt PWR  as given;  
b. the monopolistic leader in industry ]1,0[∈i  chooses )}(),({ , iLiP txt  to maximize profit according 
to the Bertrand competition and taking }{ tW  as given; 
c. R&D entrepreneur ]1,0[∈j  chooses )}({ , jL tr  to maximize profit taking },{ tt VW  as given;  
d. the market for final goods clears such that ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛== ∫∫ 1
0
1
0
)(lnexp)( diiXCdhhC ttt ; 
e. the labor market clears such that ∫∫∫ +== 1
0
,
1
0
,
1
0
)()()( djjLdiiLLdhhL trtxtt .  
To prove that the aggregate economy is always on a unique and stable balanced-growth path, we 
derive the law of motion for tE  in the appendix and show that it must jump to its steady-state value. A 
necessary and sufficient condition for the saddle-point stability is  
(a3) )1,(
ln)1(
)1(1 −∞∈≡+
+−> γμφ
μφγ
z
. 
 
Lemma 2: The aggregate economy is always on a unique and stable balanced-growth path, and the 
balanced-growth equilibrium is characterized by  
(13) 
z
LL rtr ln)1()1/()1(
)/1()1/()1(
, −+++
+−++== γφμμφ
ϕρφμμφ
, 
(14) rt Lzgg )ln(ϕ== , 
(15) grrt .γρ +== , 
(16) ttt wvgrC +−=+ )()1( φ . 
Proof: See Appendix A.■  
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tttt PPRr /&−≡  denotes the real interest rate. ttt PWw /≡  and ttt PVv /≡  denote respectively the real 
wage rate and the real value of assets that are both increasing at rate g along the balanced-growth path. In 
(16), tt wC >+ )1( φ  because 0)1( >−+=− ggr γρ  from (a1). The effect of increasing patent breadth 
on the equilibrium is as follows. A larger μ  increases the incentives for R&D; as a result, R&D labor 
increases. The increase in rL  increases the equilibrium growth rate g  and the real interest rate r . To 
ensure that 0>rL , I impose a lower bound on the productivity of R&D labor given by  
(a4) )1/()1( −+> μφμρϕ . 
 
3.1. Distribution of Assets 
I adopt a similar approach as in Garcia-Penalosa and Turnovsky (2006) to show that the distribution of 
assets is stationary. To do this, it is more convenient to rewrite (2) in terms of real variables such that  
(17) )()()()( hChLwhvrhv tttttt −+=& . 
The real aggregate value of assets evolves according to  
(18) tttttt CLwvrv −+=& . 
Combining (17) and (18) yields the law of motion for tttv vhvhs /)()(, ≡  given by  
(19) 
)(
)()(
)(
)(
)(
)(
,
,
hv
hLwhC
v
LwC
v
v
hv
hv
hs
hs
t
ttt
t
ttt
t
t
t
t
tv
tv −−−=−= &&& . 
Using )()](1[ . hChLw ttt φ=−  on (19), )(, hs tv  evolves according to a simple linear differential equation  
(20) 
t
ttc
tv
t
tt
tv v
wChshs
v
wChs −+−−+= )1()()()1()( ,, φφ& . 
(20) describes the potential evolution of )(, hs tv  given an initial value of )(0, hsv . ttc ChChs /)()( ≡  is a 
stationary variable from Lemma 1. Because tC , tw  and tv  all increase at rate g , the coefficient on 
)(, hs tv  and the last term in (20) are constant. Given that the coefficient on )(, hs tv  is positive (recall that 
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tt wC >+ )1( φ ), the only solution consistent with long-run stability is 0)(, =hs tv&  for all t. Furthermore, 
from (20), 0)(, =hs tv&  for all t implies that  
(21) ttt whvgrhC +−=+ )()()()1( φ . 
 
Lemma 3: For every household, )()( 0,, hshs vtv =  for all t.   
Proof: Proven in the text.■  
 
4. Effects of Patent Policy on Income and Consumption Inequality 
Given that the economy is always on a unique and stable balanced-growth path and the distribution of 
assets is stationary, this section analyzes the effects of increasing patent breadth on income and 
consumption inequality. The amount of real income earned by household h is  
(22) )()()()()( . hCwhvrhLwhvrhy ttttttttt φ−+=+= . 
From (12), (21) and Lemma 3, the share of income earned by household h simplifies to  
(23) ϕφ
ϕφ
++
++=≡
gr
hsgr
y
hyhs v
t
t
ty
.
. )()()()( 0,,  
for all t. (23) implies that the standard deviation of income share ∫ −≡ 1
0
2
, ]1)([ dhhs tyyσ  is  
(24) vy gr
gr σϕφ
φσ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
++
+=
.
.
. 
Using the standard deviation of income share (i.e. the coefficient of variation of income) as a measure of 
income inequality, Proposition 1 summarizes the effect of patent policy on income inequality.   
 
Proposition 1: An increase in the level of patent breadth increases income inequality.  
Proof: An increase in b  (i.e. an increase in μ ) raises r  and g , which in turn increases yσ .■ 
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Intuitively, a larger patent breadth increases R&D and hence the equilibrium growth rate. This higher 
growth rate drives up the real interest rate, and the resulting higher return on assets increases the share of 
income )(hsy  earned by asset-wealthy households (i.e. 1)( >hsv ) while it decreases that of asset-poor 
households (i.e. 1)( <hsv ). Note that increasing patent breadth raises income inequality even in the case 
of inelastic labor supply (i.e. 0=φ ). 
 The consumption of final goods for household h is given by (21). Using (12), (16) and Lemma 3 
yields household h’s share of consumption given by  
(25) ϕ
ϕ
+−
+−=≡
gr
hsgr
C
hChs v
t
t
tc
)()()()( 0,,  
for all t. (25) implies that the standard deviation of consumption share ∫ −≡ 1
0
2
, ]1)([ dhhs tccσ  is  
(26) vc gr
gr σϕσ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+−
−= . 
Proposition 2 summarizes the effect of patent policy on consumption inequality.   
 
Proposition 2: An increase in the level of patent breadth increases (decreases) consumption inequality if 
and only if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution ε  is less (greater) than unity.  
Proof: An increase in b  (i.e. an increase in μ ) raises r  and g . (15) shows that the resulting increases in 
r  and g  lead to a higher (lower) cσ  if and only if εγ /1=  is greater (less) than one.■ 
 
Intuitively, strengthening patent protection increases growth, and this higher growth rate increases each 
household’s saving )(. hvg t . At the same time, the higher growth rate also increases each household’s 
asset income )(. hvr t . Given that the fraction of assets to be consumed is given by gr − , whether or not 
the increase in asset income is sufficient to compensate for the increase in saving depends on the value of 
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ε . For ε  less (larger) than one, gr −  increases (decreases). A larger gr −  increases the share of 
consumption )(hsc  by asset-wealthy households ( 1)( >hsv ) and decreases that of asset-poor households 
( 1)( <hsv ). The opposite occurs when gr −  decreases. For the case of log utility, ρ=− gr  and hence 
consumption inequality is simply given by )/( ϕρρσσ += vc .  
 Finally, Proposition 3 ranks the different measures of inequality according to their value, and the 
theoretical ranking is consistent with the empirical pattern in the US as documented by Budria-Rodriguez 
et al. (2002), Krueger and Perri (2006), and Blundell et al. (2008). 
 
Proposition 3: Wealth inequality > income inequality > consumption inequality. 
Proof: Comparing (24) and (26) shows that cyv σσσ >> .■ 
 
4.1. Numerical Analysis 
This section calibrates the model to aggregate data of the US economy in order to numerically evaluate 
the effects of patent breadth on income and consumption inequality. From the model, I express each of 
the following moments as a function of structural parameters and then use the values of these moments in 
the data to infer the parameter values. I use standard values for the fraction of time devoted to leisure 
7.0=l , the real rate of return on assets 07.0=r , and total factor productivity growth 01.0=g . For the 
arrival rate of inventions, I set λ  to 0.33 such that the average time between arrivals of inventions is 3 
years as in Acemoglu and Akcigit (2008). R&D spending as a share of GDP is given by )/( wLwLr +π  
in the model. Assuming that the increase in R&D spending since the 80’s has been driven by patent 
protection, the hypothetical exercise is to firstly use the time trend of R&D from 1980 to 2004 to infer a 
time path for patent breadth b  and then examine how the increase in b  affects the relative level of 
income and consumption inequality. Figure 1 plots R&D as a share of GDP and its trend. 
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Given a value for γ , the five moment conditions determine respectively the values of 
},,,,{ bz ϕρφ . As for γ , I use a conservative value of 3 implying an intertemporal substitution elasticity 
of 0.33 that is within the usual range in the business-cycle literature.5 The calibrated parameter values are 
}62.0,4.71,03.1,04.0,33.2,3{ 1980 ====== bz ϕρφγ . The values of the standard parameters are 
reasonable, and the large value of ϕ  implies that asset income from patents tvr .  is very small compared 
to labor income Lwt , where tt vw .ϕ=  from (12). This implication also seems reasonable given that labor 
income and industrial R&D are on average about 70% and less than 2% of GDP respectively.  
 The calibrated value of b  gradually increases from 0.62 in 1980 to 0.86 in 2004 implying a 
substantial increase in the level of patent breadth. As a result of the increase in b , the model predicts that 
the relative coefficient of variation between income and consumption (i.e. cy σσ / ) increases from 1.55 in 
1980 to 1.69 in 2004. This illustrative exercise suggests that for a given degree of wealth inequality, 
increasing patent breadth leads to a larger increase in income inequality than consumption inequality such 
that cy σσ /  increases over time, which is consistent with the empirical pattern in the US.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper analyzes the effects of patent policy on growth and inequality. In summary, strengthening 
patent protection increases growth but worsens income inequality. However, the effect on consumption 
inequality is ambiguous and depends on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. To derive these 
results, this paper incorporates heterogeneity in households’ wealth into a canonical quality-ladder model. 
In this model, the effect of patent policy on income inequality is driven by the rate of return on assets. 
Therefore, even if patents do not represent a significant fraction of assets in reality, the effect of patent 
policy on income inequality can still be significant in the presence of other capital incomes that depend on 
the real interest rate. Furthermore, although the prevailing wisdom is that the rising income inequality in 
                                                 
5 At a lower value of γ  (i.e. a larger ε ), strengthening patent protection would increase income inequality relative 
to consumption inequality by even more.  
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the US is largely driven by an increase in the relative wage between skilled and unskilled workers, some 
studies, such as Atkinson (2000, 2003), suggest that inequality in capital income is also playing an 
increasingly important role. For example, Reed and Cancian (2001) show that capital income contributes 
to one quarter of the increase in income inequality in the 90’s while it accounts for less than one-tenth of 
the increase in the 70’s. Also, Poterba (1998) shows that the rate of return on corporate assets in the US 
steadily rises from 1980 to 1996. Shapiro and Friedman (2006) document that capital income has become 
much more concentrated at the top-income group. Finally, two potential weaknesses of the current study 
are that the model takes the wealth distribution as given and it does not feature capital accumulation. 
Therefore, a possible direction for future research is to develop a model that endogenizes the wealth 
distribution and features capital accumulation in order to provide a more accurate assessment on the 
quantitative importance of patent policy on the distributions of wealth, income and consumption.  
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Appendix 
Proof for Lemma 2: To show the stability and uniqueness of the balanced-growth path, we derive the 
law of motion for ttt CPE ≡  and analyze its dynamics. The labor-market clearing condition is  
(A1) trtxt LLL ,, += . 
From aggregate labor supply, tt EL .1 φ−= . From the labor share of aggregate expenditure, μ/, ttx EL = . 
From the R&D production function, ϕλ /, ttrL = . Substituting these conditions into (A1) yields 
(A2) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−= tt Eμ
μφϕλ 11 . 
From (5), the law of motion for tE  is  
(A3) 
)1()1(
1
γφγ
ρ
γφγ
γ
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The price index is ttt ZdiiPP /)(lnexp
1
0
μ=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= ∫ , where ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛≡ ∫∫ ttt zdzdiinZ
0
1
0
lnexpln)(exp τλτ  
denotes aggregate technology. Thus, zZZPP ttttt ln// λ−=−= && . As for tR , using (10) and (12) yields  
(A4) ϕ
ϕλπλπ
/1
/tt
t
tttt
t V
VVR −=−+= & . 
Using the profit share μμπ /)1( −= tt E  and substituting (A4) into (A3) yield 
(A5) 
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Substituting (A2) into (A5) yields  
(A6) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−−
−++−⎟⎟⎠
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(a2) and (a3) imply that the coefficient on tE  is positive, so that the dynamic system is characterized by 
global instability. Therefore, tE  must jump to its non-zero steady-state value given by  
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(A7) ⎟⎟⎠
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⎛
++−+
−++=
)1(ln)1)(1(
ln)1(
φμγμφ
γϕϕρ
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zE . 
Substituting (A7) into (A2) and using the R&D production function yield   
(A8) 
z
Lr ln)1()1/()1(
)/1()1/()1(
−+++
+−++== γφμμφ
ϕρφμμφ
ϕ
λ
. 
The aggregate production function xtt LZC =  implies tttt ZZCC // && =  while the price index tt ZP /μ=  
implies tttt ZZPP // && −= . Substituting these conditions into (5) yields 
(A9) gr .γρ += . 
Finally, combining (18) and )1(. ttt LwC −=φ  yields 
(A10) ttttttt CwvgrLwvgrC .)()( φ−+−=+−=  
because ttt PVv /=  grows at rate g  along the balanced-growth path.■ 
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Figure 1: Industrial R&D as a Share of Non-Farm Business-Sector Output in the U.S.
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Data sources: (a) National Science Foundation: Division of Science Resources Statistics; and (b) Bureau of 
Economic Analysis: National Income and Product Accounts.  
Footnote: R&D is net of federal spending, and non-farm business-sector output is calculated as GDP net of 
government spending and farm-sector output. The trend from the data is extracted using a standard HP-filter with a 
smoothing parameter of 100 for the annual frequency.  
 
  
 - 20 -
Figure 2: Number of Patents Granted
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Data source: Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2002): The NBER Patent Citation Data File. 
 
